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Segal: Unusual Circumstances Test

LEE V. UNITED STATES: THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
TEST FOR STRICKLAND RELIEF
Zachary Segal*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 31, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided
Padilla v. Kentucky.1 Jose Padilla, born in Honduras, had been living
in the United States for over four decades as “a lawful permanent
resident.”2 Years later, however, he was charged with transporting
marijuana.3 Padilla asked his attorney whether a conviction would
affect his immigration status, and Padilla’s attorney responded that
Padilla had nothing to worry about.4 Relying on his attorney’s advice,
Padilla pled guilty to the crime only to find that his conviction
mandated automatic deportation.5 Padilla then, in subsequent postconviction proceedings, challenged the legality of his guilty plea—
resulting in a denial by the Kentucky Supreme Court followed by an
appeal to the nation’s highest court.6 The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether a non-citizen’s Sixth Amendment right to effective

* Zachary Segal is a Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center, B.S.C Political Science & History, 2014, The University of Ottawa. The author
would first like to thank Cory Morris for introducing him to the importance of writing about
contemporary issues by allowing him to co-author articles. The author would also like to
thank Professor Richard Klein for his guidance in writing this Note. Thanks are also due to
Rhona Mae Amorado for her patience and assistance in structuring this Note. Finally, this
Note would not have been possible without the Touro Law Center and Aleph-Institute because
their dedication to public interest inspired this author to write this Note on a Sixth Amendment
topic. All mistakes are the fault of this author and no other.
1 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2 Id. at 359.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364.
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assistance of counsel was violated when an attorney fails to advise the
non-citizen that a criminal conviction could result in deportation.7
Courts use the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis
prescribed in the landmark 1984 case, Strickland v. Washington.8 To
find ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must determine (1)
whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness”9; and (2) whether the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.10 In the context of plea agreements, the Court,
in Hill v. Lockhart,11 held that showing prejudice requires “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant]
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.”12 Accordingly, the Court in Padilla was presented with two
specific questions: (1) whether an attorney’s failure to advise his noncitizen client of deportation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) if so, whether his non-citizen client was
prejudiced as a result of the attorney’s deficient performance because,
but for counsel’s error, he would have gone to trial.13
The Court answered the first question in the affirmative by
holding that an attorney’s performance is objectively unreasonable
when—regardless of how clear the immigration laws are—he fails to
inform a non-citizen client that deportation will, or might, follow from
a conviction.14 The second question, or the prejudice prong, however,
7
Id. at 360 (“We granted certiorari to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s
counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would
result in his removal from this county.” (internal citations omitted)).
8 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9 Id. at 688.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
. . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. . . . When a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. . . . The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
Id. at 687-88, 694.
10 Id. at 688.
11 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
12 Id. at 59.
13 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360, 372.
14 Id. at 373-74 (“It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal
defendant—whether a citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’ To
satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation.” (internal citation omitted)).
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was more complex considering a petitioner needed to show, but for
counsel’s errors, a reasonable petitioner in his situation would have
gone to trial even though deportation was inevitable.15 In its analysis
of the prejudice prong, the Court explained the appropriate question
was whether a deportable non-citizen’s decision to reject the plea and
to pursue trial would be rational.16 Instead of answering this question
in this case, however, the Court remanded that question to Kentucky’s
highest court as a matter of first impression.17
In the wake of Padilla, courts were split over whether it would
be rational for a defendant, facing deportation, to reject a favorable
plea agreement in order to “throw ‘a Hail Mary’”18 at trial.19
Specifically, under what, if any, circumstances could prejudice be
proven when guilt automatically results in deportation?20 Another
uncertainty facing the lower courts was whether Padilla was
retroactive.21 In Chaidez v. United States,22 a case decided three years
after Padilla, the Court held Padilla was not retroactive pursuant to

15 Daniel A. Horwitz, Actually, Padilla Does Apply to Undocumented Defendants, 19
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (“Specifically, these authorities have reasoned that because
‘a guilty plea does not increase the risk of deportation’ for undocumented defendants, ‘in a
situation where a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea based on Padilla, and alleges lack of
knowledge of the risk of deportation, prejudice cannot be established[.]’” (alteration in
original) (internal citations omitted)).
16 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
17 Id. at 374 (“Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will depend on whether he can
demonstrate prejudice as a result thereof, a question we do not reach because it was not passed
on below.”).
18 Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311, 313 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 614
(2016), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017). Although the Sixth Circuit does not
explicitly define “Hail Mary,” the context allows the inference that it refers to whether a
petitioner can try his luck, despite overwhelming odds, that he will obtain a different outcome
at trial. See id.
19 Id.
As a factual matter, we do not doubt Lee’s contention that many
defendants in his position, had they received accurate advice from
counsel, would have decided to risk a longer prison sentence in order to
take their chances at trial, slim though they were.
But would such a decision be “rational”? Several courts, including
this circuit, have said “no”: being denied the chance to throw “a Hail
Mary” at trial does not by itself amount to prejudice.
Id.
20 Id.
21 See infra Part IV.A.
22 568 U.S. 342 (2013).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 [2018], Art. 7

826

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

Teague v. Lane;23 nevertheless, confusion remained as to whether this
meant misadvice claims were also denied retroactive effect.24
In June 2017, Lee v. United States25 answered both questions
left behind by Padilla when it held, “[W]e cannot agree that it would
be irrational for a defendant in Lee’s position to reject the plea offer in
favor of trial.”26 First, Lee expressly held it could be rational for a noncitizen defendant to reject a plea in lieu of trial when his attorney
erroneously advises him about whether deportation will result from a
conviction.27 However, Lee limited this showing to Jae Lee’s (“Lee”)
unusual circumstances.28 Second, although Chaidez held Padilla is not
retroactive,29 Chaidez focused on the “new rule” established by Padilla
(i.e., counsel must inform a defendant of potential immigration
consequences of a guilty plea).30 Therefore, by accepting petitioner
Lee’s writ of certiorari, Lee confirmed that Padilla is retroactive
regarding erroneous immigration advice because Lee was convicted
one year before the Supreme Court decided Padilla.31
Lee has wide-ranging effects on non-citizen defendants
because it implicates both prongs of Strickland. First, by granting
23

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
See infra Part IV.A.4.
25 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).
26 Id. at 1968.
27 Id. at 1968-69.
28 Id. at 1967.
29 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 357.
30 Id. at 346.
Padilla’s new rule plainly governs failure-to-advise claims . . . leaving
three possibilities for Padilla’s impact on misadvice claims. First, the new
rule may encompass such claims, meaning that Castro may avail himself
of the misadvice holding under Teague only if there was First Circuit
precedent prior to 2003 that would have dictated the same outcome
as Padilla would in this case. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110-12. Second,
the misadvice portion of Padilla’s holding may reflect established law,
and thus not be part of the new rule—in which case Castro may rely on
that holding (at least assuming there was no contrary First Circuit
precedent as of 2003). Third, as explained below, neither of these
alternatives may be clearly discernible from Padilla and Chaidez,
requiring us to examine our own and other courts’ cases to determine the
state of the law as of 2003.
United States v. Castro–Taveras, 841 F.3d 34, 41 n.7 (1st Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original);
See also United States v. Chan, 792 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2015); Kovacs v. United States, 744
F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2014).
31 Ex Parte Osvaldo, 534 S.W.3d 607, 621 (Tex. App. 2017) (“Had the Supreme Court
viewed Lee’s misadvice claim as being barred by the non-retroactivity of Padilla’s rule, it
could have denied the writ.”).
24

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss3/7

4

Segal: Unusual Circumstances Test

2018

UNUSUAL CIRCUMTSANCES TEST

827

Lee’s writ, the Court held misadvising a client of deportation is
objectively unreasonable under Strickland and, thus, retroactive under
Padilla. Second, rejecting a plea based on attorney misadvice could
be considered a rational decision to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice
prong. The Court held it would not be irrational to reject a plea and
pursue trial, but it limited its holding to Lee’s unusual circumstances.
This Note argues that while Lee confirmed that Padilla is
retroactive regarding misadvice claims, the Court construed its rule so
narrowly that post-conviction relief for non-citizen defendants—
convicted before or after Padilla—will be limited to a very specific
class of individuals who satisfy what this Note coins as the “unusual
circumstance test.” Therefore, a petitioner seeking relief under Lee
must show the following: (1) counsel erroneously misadvised the
petitioner regarding deportation; (2) deportation was the determinative
issue in pleading guilty; (3) the record unambiguously supports this
contention; (4) the petitioner has strong ties to the United States
compared to the home country; and (5) the difference between
pleading guilty and the maximum sentence at trial are not grossly
disproportionate or an alternative disposition could be obtained at trial.
This Note will be separated into eight parts. Part II traces the
procedural history of Lee’s journey to the Supreme Court. Part III
briefly explores the precedential history of ineffective counsel
concluding with Padilla. Part IV explains the circuit-court splits and
the contrasting approaches to Padilla’s unanswered questions. Part V
returns to Lee in order to show why the case resolves Padilla’s
unanswered questions concerning retroactivity and what is rational.
Part VI will look at how cases apply Lee followed by Part VII which
will synthesize Lee’s holding with subsequent courts applying Lee to
show how a non-citizen petitioner can obtain relief under Lee. Part
VIII will conclude by predicting why Lee’s holding will result in an
influx of unsuccessful ineffective counsel claims or Lee claims.
II.

JAE LEE’S JOURNEY TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT

In 1982, thirteen-year old Lee and his family left South Korea
for a new life in the United States.32 For thirty-five years, Lee, a

32

Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1962.
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permanent resident, never returned to his native South Korea.33 Like
countless other new immigrants, Lee’s family settled in New York
City.34 Lee seemed to be on the road towards living the American
dream––after graduating business school, Lee moved to Memphis to
work in a restaurant.35 A few years later, with the help of his parents,
Lee opened his first Chinese restaurant and opened a second shortly
thereafter.36
Despite Lee’s success in the restaurant industry, he was, for
reasons unknown, also a small-time drug dealer.37 A confidential
government informant revealed to authorities that Lee, over eight
years, “sold the informant approximately 200 ecstasy pills and two
ounces of hydroponic marijuana.”38 Following a raid on Lee’s home,
authorized by a search warrant, authorities discovered “88 ecstasy
pills, three Valium tablets, $32,432 in cash, and a loaded rifle.”39 Lee
took full responsibility for the drugs and weapon discovered.40
A.

Plea Bargain

Lee was indicted by a federal grand jury “on one count of
possessing ecstasy with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1).”41 Having no experience in the court system, Lee relied on
his retained attorney who explained that Lee should plead guilty
because trial was “very risky,”42 and a guilty plea likely would result
in a “lighter sentence.”43 Specifically, as a first time offender, Lee was
eligible for the safety valve exception44 to the otherwise ten year
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 1963.
Id. at 1962.
Id.
Id. at 1963.
Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963.
Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012), which provided:
Limitation on applicability of statutory minimums in certain cases.—
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of an offense
under section 401, 404, or 406 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 841, 844, 846) or section 1010 or 1013 of the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 960, 963), the court shall
impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United
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mandatory minimum for the charged offense.45 Although Lee trusted
his attorney’s advice, he repeatedly asked his attorney if his noncitizen status would result in deportation following the criminal
proceedings to which the attorney replied, “[H]e would not be deported
as a result of pleading guilty.”46
During the plea hearing, the presiding judge warned Lee that a
conviction could result in Lee’s deportation, followed by asking Lee if
deportation affects his decision.47 Lee replied in the positive
prompting the judge to question why deportation would affect his
decision.48 Stunned, Lee asked his attorney what the judge was talking
about and the attorney replied the judge’s question was a “standard

States Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28 without
regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing,
after the Government has been afforded the opportunity to make a
recommendation, that—
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as
determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or
possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another
participant to do so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any
person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and
was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in section
408 of the Controlled Substances Act; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has
truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the
same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that
the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that
the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a
determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this
requirement.
45 United States v. Lee, No. 10-02698-JTF-dkv, 2013 WL 8116841, at *2, *12 (W.D. Tenn.
Aug. 6, 2013), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, 2014 WL
1260388 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014), aff’d, 825 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d and
remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017), vacated 869 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 2017).
46 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963. “In fact, Lee explained, his attorney became ‘pretty upset because
every time something comes up I always ask about immigration status,’ and the lawyer ‘always
said why [are you] worrying about something that you don’t need to worry about.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
47 Id. at 1968 (“When the judge warned him that a conviction ‘could result in your being
deported,’ and asked ‘[d]oes that at all affect your decision about whether you want to plead
guilty or not,’ Lee answered ‘Yes, Your Honor.’” (alteration in original)).
48 Id.
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warning.”49 Convinced pleading guilty would not result in inevitable
deportation, Lee entered a guilty plea, and the court sentenced him to
imprisonment for one year and one day.50
Shortly after receiving an otherwise very lenient sentence, for
a crime carrying a ten year mandatory minimum,51 Lee learned he pled
guilty to an aggravated felony under the Immigration Nationality Act,
which, according to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),52 required
mandatory deportation because of his non-citizen status.53 Lee,
however, was eligible for the safety valve exception, which could have
spared Lee the mandatory minimum because he was a first-time
offender as well as reducing the sentence from a three to five year
period of incarceration versus a likely mandatory minimum without
the safety valve.54 Lee immediately sought post-conviction relief and
filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,55 seeking his conviction
and sentence be vacated because of defense counsel’s “constitutionally
ineffective assistance.”56
B.

Procedural History

The Magistrate recommended Lee’s conviction be set aside
because it was based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
effective counsel.57 The Magistrate explained that the Court in
Chaidez confirmed that Padilla was not retroactive regarding failure
to advise claims, which, thus, had no bearing on Lee because Lee was

49

Id.
Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963.
51 See 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012).
52 “Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon
the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is . . . convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
53 Id.
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), supra note 44.
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), which provided:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
56 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963.
57 Lee, 2013 WL 8116841, at *1.
50
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relying on a separate, pre-existing rule (i.e., affirmative misadvice).58
Moreover, considering the two-year difference between what Lee
would have received under a plea and trial—because of safety valve
eligibility—pursuing trial would have been rational.59 As such, the
Magistrate found Lee met both prongs of the Strickland test because
of the following: (1) affirmative misadvice to a client regarding
deportation is objectively unreasonable;60 and (2) Lee was prejudiced
by this misadvice—evidenced by Lee’s otherwise likely decision to try
his luck at trial.61
The District Court declined to adopt the Magistrate’s
recommendation and denied Lee’s motion, stating Lee did not meet the
prejudice prong of Strickland.62 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing
with the District Court’s finding that Lee could not show prejudice
under Strickland.63 The Sixth Circuit, however, provided more insight
into its decision to deny Lee relief.64 The Sixth Circuit remarked,
following Padilla, that other circuits were split regarding whether it
would be “rational” to proceed to trial, despite overwhelming odds,
with the hope of avoiding deportation.65
On one side of the split was the Second, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits, which declined to find prejudice when the petitioner could
not show any benefit from relief aside from a re-trial.66 These courts
opined, pursuant to Hill, it would be objectively irrational to pursue
trial when deportation was inevitable and there was no legal gain.67
58

Id. at *8.
The “new rule” identified by the Court in Chaidez as having been
announced in Padilla is one that speaks to the attorney’s obligation to act
(specifically, to advise). . . . Thus, to the extent Lee’s claim relies on a
“separate rule” for affirmative misadvice in place at the time of his
conviction, the fact that Padilla is not retroactive is inconsequential to
Lee’s case.

Id.
59

Id. at *12.
Id. at *11.
61 Lee, 2013 WL 8116841, at *12.
62 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1964 (“But, ‘[i]n light of the overwhelming evidence of Lee’s guilt,’
Lee ‘would have almost certainly’ been found guilty and received ‘a significantly longer
prison sentence, and subsequent deportation,’ had he gone to trial.” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)).
63 Id.; see also Lee, 825 F.3d at 313.
64 Id. at 313.
65 Id. at 313-14.
66 Id. at 313.
67 See infra Part IV.B.1.
60
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The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, found prejudice
based solely on the misadvice itself.68 Of particular relevance, all of
these courts agreed individuals in Lee’s position could show the
erroneous advice satisfied the first prong of Strickland, but disagreed
on how prejudice could be shown.69 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit sided
with the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits “in holding that a
claimant’s ties to the United States should be taken into account in
evaluating, alongside the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice
caused prejudice.”70
While the Sixth Circuit denied Lee’s motion, it explained its
duty “is neither to prosecute nor to pardon; it is simply to say, ‘what
the law is.’”71 The Sixth Circuit understood the existing law to mean
a bare bones misadvice claim, without some legal gain, was
insufficient to raise a successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.72 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether
[Lee] can show he was prejudiced as a result”73 of the unanimously
agreed objectively unreasonable representation that he received during
the plea phase.74
C.

The United States Supreme Court Decision

The Court focused its attention on the prejudice prong of
Strickland.75 The Court discussed the history behind the prejudice
68

Id. at 314.
Compare Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012) (not rational), Haddad
v. United States, 486 F. App’x 517, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2012) (same), Kovacs v. United States,
744 F.3d 44, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2014) (same), United States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 255–56
(4th Cir. 2012) (same), and United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 724–29 (5th Cir. 2014)
(same), with United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643–46 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated on other
grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), DeBartolo v. United States, 790
F.3d 775, 777–80 (7th Cir. 2015), United States v. Rodriguez–Vega, 797 F.3d 781, 789–90
(9th Cir. 2015), and Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2015).
70 Lee, 825 F.3d at 316 (emphasis in original).
71 Id. at 317 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
72 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1964 (“Relying on Circuit precedent holding that ‘no rational defendant
charged with a deportable offense and facing overwhelming evidence of guilt would proceed
to trial rather than take a plea deal with a shorter sentence,’ the Court of Appeals concluded
that Lee could not show prejudice.” (citation omitted)).
73 Id. at 1962.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1964 (“The first requirement is not at issue in today’s case: The Government
concedes that Lee’s plea-stage counsel provided inadequate representation when he assured
Lee that he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty. The question is whether Lee can show
he was prejudiced by that erroneous advice.” (citations omitted)).
69
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prong for ineffective plea-stage counsel claims, concluding Hill
requires that courts determine whether the petitioner would have gone
to trial but for his attorney’s error.76 The majority focused on whether
Lee would have gone to trial but for counsel’s misadvice.77 The
majority took this approach because it interpreted Hill to mean that
determinative issues behind pleading and going to trial, although
usually resting on the shortest sentence, can also involve risk of
deportation.78
Deportation can be considered more severe than a few years in
prison, which would justify rejecting an otherwise favorable plea
agreement.79 In fact, as the Court noted, “preserving a client’s right to
remain in the United States may be more important to the client than
any potential jail sentence.”80 Therefore, by repeatedly asking his
attorney if a guilty plea would result in his deportation, Lee proved that
the determinative issue for him in pleading guilty was whether he
would be deported.81 Lee’s prejudice, thus, was the inability to make
an informed decision as to whether pleading guilty would affect his
status in the United States––the only home he knew.82 By focusing on
Lee’s determinative issue, the Court’s decision was not confined to
whether the outcome would be different, but rather whether Lee had a
chance to act on the determinative issue.83

76 Id. at 1965 (“As we held in Hill v. Lockhart, when a defendant claims that his counsel’s
deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant
can show prejudice by demonstrating a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” (quoting Hill,
474 U.S. at 59).
77 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965.
78 Id. at 1966.
79 Id. at 1968; see Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322-23
(2001); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 (stating “deportation is an integral part—indeed,
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes” (footnote omitted)); Jennifer H. Berman,
Padilla v. Kentucky: Overcoming Teague’s “Watershed” Exception to Non-Retroactivity, 15
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 700 (2014) (“If armed with the knowledge that a conviction is almost
certain to land a defendant in immigration court, a defendant may very well choose to risk
going to trial rather than accept a plea deal offering a reduced sentence.”).
80 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322).
81 Id.; see United States v. Pola, 703 F. App’x 414 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the petitioner’s
pro se argument that deportation was a determinative issue because the record did not support
the contention and the petitioner knew deportation was a possibility because ICE agents were
in courtroom).
82 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968.
83 Id. at 1967.
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However, the Court narrowed its rule to Lee’s “unusual
circumstances.”84 In doing so, the Court essentially encouraged lower
courts to consider the outcome when ruling on ineffective assistance
of counsel claims presented by non-citizen defendants.85 Lee was able
to satisfy this requirement because his eligibility for the safety valve
reduced the ten-year mandatory minimum at trial to two to three years;
gambling two to three years, instead of accepting a one-year plea,
would be rational.86
Another one of Lee’s unusual circumstances was the record
supported his claim that deportation was the determinative issue in his
decision to plead guilty.87 The Court cautioned against “post hoc
assertions” by claimants that, but for their attorney’s misadvice, they
would have pleaded guilty because deportation was the determinative
issue.88 To further this end, the Court required the petitioners to point
to the record in order to prove deportation was in fact the determinative
issue when they entered the guilty plea.89
The Court concluded, “Lee has demonstrated a ‘reasonable
probability that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’”90 The
consideration of the trial outcome, however, is not irrelevant in
conducting the analysis because Lee had a mere two years to lose by
going to trial.91 Thus, a decision to pursue trial to avoid deportation,
despite inevitable deportation, would be rational for a petitioner in
Lee’s position.92
The dissenting Justices, however, rejected the majority’s
holding because it “announce[d] a novel standard for prejudice at the
plea stage.”93 The standard was deemed novel because Lee could not
show, but for his counsel’s misadvice, the outcome would be

84

Id.
See infra Part V.
86 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967 (“But where we are instead asking what an individual defendant
would have done, the possibility of even a highly improbable result may be pertinent to the
extent it would have affected his decisionmaking.”).
87 Id. at 1969.
88
Id.at 1967; See also Pola, 703 F. App’x at 421.
89 See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
90 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1969 (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 59) (alteration in original).
91 Id. at 1967; see supra note 86.
92 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1969.
93 Id. at 1969 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
85
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different.94 The dissenting Justices concluded the Court erroneously
found Lee showed prejudice because, even with competent advice, Lee
likely would have lost at trial and been deported.95 Therefore, the
novel standard, according to the dissent, provides that a petitioner can
overturn a conviction if he, by pointing to the record, can show he
subjectively would have rejected the plea and gone to trial, but for
counsel’s misadvice regarding the consequences of the guilty plea.96
According to the dissenting Justices, this novel standard is
dangerous because it re-defined the prejudice prong of Strickland.97
The dissent maintained the prejudice prong was re-defined because
Strickland sought to narrow its holding to preclude reversal based on a
“Hail Mary.”98 Strickland, thus, wanted to avoid petitioners coming
forth with ineffective counsel claims based on a subjective belief and
hope that an irrational jury would decide the case in his or her favor.99
While the dissent focused the bulk of its criticism on the
majority’s holding regarding the diminution of the prejudice prong, the
Justices also predicted an influx of ineffective counsel claims resulting

94 Id. at 1970 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“In other words, the defendant’s ability to
show that he would have gone to trial is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish prejudice.”).
95 Id. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Compare Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“An
error by counsel . . . does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if
the error had no effect on the judgment.”), with Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370 (1993)
(“Sheer outcome determination, however, was not sufficient to make out a claim under the
Sixth Amendment.”), and Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 204 (2001) (“Although the
amount by a which a defendant’s sentence is increased by a particular decision may be a factor
to consider in determining whether counsel’s performance in failing to argue the point
constitutes ineffective assistance, under a determinate system of constrained discretion[,] . . .
it cannot serve as a bar to a showing of prejudice.”).
96 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1970 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
97 Id. at 1973 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.) (“In my view, we should take the Court’s
precedents at their word and conclude that ‘[a]n error by counsel . . . does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691)).
98 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.); see also Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 695 (“A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker . . . .”).
99 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.)
In the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt and in the absence of a bona
fide defense, a reasonable court or jury applying the law to the facts of this
case would find the defendant guilty. There is no reasonable probability
of any other verdict. A defendant in petitioner’s shoes, therefore, would
have suffered the same deportation consequences regardless of whether
he accepted a plea or went to trial. . . . Finding that petitioner has
established prejudice in these circumstances turns Strickland on its head.
Id. (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.)
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from matters a defendant placed “paramount importance”100 on during
plea negotiations.101 Particularly, the majority’s decision impacts the
entire plea process because they lack the finality previously accorded
to them.102 By concluding Lee’s attorney violated his Sixth
Amendment rights, the holding is not limited to immigration cases, and
so “a defendant who pleaded guilty need show only that he would have
rejected his plea and gone to trial” to obtain relief.103
III.

INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL 101

The Assistance of Counsel Clause in the Sixth Amendment
guarantees, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”104
Assistance, however, does not merely mean having any counsel
present, but rather effective assistance is required per the Sixth
Amendment.105 Therefore, in order to raise an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, Strickland held the petitioner must show (1) his
counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.”106
Under Strickland, the reviewing court must find that the
petitioner satisfies both prongs before obtaining any relief.107 The first
prong evaluates whether counsel’s representation “fell below an

100

Id. (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Under its rule, so long as a defendant alleges that
his counsel omitted or misadvised him on a piece of information during the plea process that
he considered of ‘paramount importance,’ he could allege a plausible claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” (internal citation omitted)).
102 Id. at 1975 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
103 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); see, e.g., Young v. Spinner,
873 F.3d 282, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that his attorney’s failure
to inform him of a potential sentence for failing to register as a sex offender influenced his
decisions to enter into a plea bargain and not go to trial); Thompson v. United States, 872 F.3d
560, 562-63 (8th Cir. 2017) (rejecting petitioner’s ineffective counsel claim that he would have
gone to trial but for counsel’s assertion that petitioner would have received twelve years in
prison when he actually received life); United States v. Vaughn, 704 F. App’x 207 (3d Cir.
2017) (reversing the district court’s holding that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to
determine whether counsel’s advice was deficient and if so, whether petitioner, convicted of
money laundering, was prejudiced).
104 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
105 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
106 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
107 Id. (“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . .
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”).
101
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objective standard of reasonableness.”108 This prong reflects what the
legal community expects of practicing attorneys.109 Thus, “[t]he
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”110
The second prong—prejudice—generally requires the lower
courts to ask whether “the result of the particular proceeding is
unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our
system counts on to produce just results.”111 However, prejudice is not
assumed once counsel’s performance has been deemed deficient
because the outcome could have otherwise been the same.112 Although
Strickland dealt with a capital case where the ineffective counsel claim
was raised due to defense counsel’s failure to compile mitigation
letters for his capital sentencing hearing,113 the standard has also been
applied to ineffective plea stage counsel.114 While the first prong of
Strickland has generally remained constant, analyzing the prejudice
prong varies for claims arising outside the death penalty setting.115
One year after Strickland, in Hill v. Lockhart, the Court
prescribed the approach for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
the context of plea agreements.116 Under the second prong, courts
consider whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.”117 In these situations, the fundamental issue
becomes whether the defendant was prejudiced by not having the

108

Id. at 688.
See id. at 687-88.
110 Id. at 688; see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367 (“The weight of prevailing professional
norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of
deportation.”).
111 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
112 Id. at 693; see Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993) (stating “[t]hus, an analysis
focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or
sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may
grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him”).
113 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
114 Hill, 474 U.S. at 58 (“We hold, therefore, that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test
applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”); see also
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 169 (2012) (“The fact that [a defendant] is guilty does not
mean he was not entitled by the Sixth Amendment to effective assistance or that he suffered
no prejudice from his attorney’s deficient performance during plea bargaining.”).
115 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000)).
116 See supra note 114.
117 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
109
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ability to exercise his right to a trial.118 However, the factors a
defendant considers when deciding whether to go to trial vary such that
one defendant may base his decision between entering a guilty plea or
trial on length of sentence while another may base the same decision
on deportation.119 When the latter is the determinative issue, the focus
shifts from whether the outcome would be different to whether
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant by disabling
him from exercising his right to pursue a jury trial.120 Therefore, the
mere fact that a defendant did not have the opportunity to make an
informed decision supersedes whether the decision would have still
resulted in a finding of guilt.121
Deportation presents a different context because the defendant
may consider deportation a greater penalty than prison.122 The Court,
in Padilla, added a new layer to Strickland when it held that counsel’s
failure to advise his client of the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea satisfied the first prong.123 However, the question of whether the
defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise was
remanded to the State.124 Nonetheless, the Court provided factors to
consider.125 Notably, one of these factors was whether rejecting the

118

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 (“The even more serious denial of the entire judicial
proceeding itself, which a defendant wanted at the time and to which he had a right, similarly
demands a presumption of prejudice.”). Conversely, a defendant who, due to erroneous advice
of counsel, rejects a plea and loses at trial, is not precluded from obtaining a chance to plead
because “criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”
Lafler, 556 U.S. at 170.
119 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
120 Id. at 1965.
When a defendant alleges his counsel’s deficient performance led him to
accept a guilty plea rather than go to trial, we do not ask whether, had he
gone to trial, the result of that trial “would have been different” than the
result of the plea bargain. That is because, while we ordinarily “apply a
strong presumption of reliability to judicial proceedings,” “we cannot
accord” any such presumption “to judicial proceedings that never took
place.”
Id. (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482-83).
121 Id. at 1966 (“And, more fundamentally, the Government overlooks that the inquiry we
prescribed in Hill v. Lockhart focuses on a defendant’s decisionmaking, which may not turn
solely on the likelihood of conviction at trial.”).
122
Id. (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322-23).
123 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.
124 Id. (“Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will depend on whether he can
satisfy Strickland’s second prong, prejudice, a matter we leave to the Kentucky courts to
consider in the first instance.”).
125 Id. at 372.
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plea in favor of trial would be “rational under the circumstances.”126
The aftermath of Padilla was wrought with confusion as to whether
Padilla was retroactive and whether it could be rational to reject a plea
agreement in lieu of trial.
IV.

THE SPLITS
A.

Padilla Is Retroactive

Following Padilla, a number of state and federal courts were
unsure as to whether Padilla was retroactive.127 Particularly, courts
questioned whether Padilla announced a “new rule,” which according
to Teague v. Lane,128 would preclude retroactivity. Prior to the Court’s
decision in Chaidez, however, two interpretations of whether Padilla
was retroactive split the circuit courts.129
1.

Between Padilla and Chaidez

According to the Third Circuit, Padilla was decided according
to the guidelines set out in Strickland and Hill such that attorneys
always had a duty to provide clients with accurate information at the
plea stage.130 Moreover, Padilla noted, “For at least the past 15 years,
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel
to provide advice on the [removal] consequences of a client’s plea.”131

126

Id.
Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 347 n.2; compare Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 693 (7th
Cir. 2011) (not retroactive), aff’d, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211
(5th Cir. 2012) (same), United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011) (same),
and State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089 (N.J. 2012) (same), with Orocio, 645 F.3d at 630
(retroactive), and Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 2011) (same).
128 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). A rule is a “new rule if the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
129 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 347.
130 Orocio, 645 F.3d at 639, abrogated by Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 342 (2013).
Strickland and Hill required counsel to advise criminal defendants at the
plea stage in accordance with precedent and prevailing professional norms
to ensure that the defendant makes an informed, knowing, and voluntary
decision whether to plead guilty. Padilla is set within the confines of
Strickland and Hill, as it concerns what advice an attorney must give to a
criminal defendant at the plea stage.
Id.
131 Id. (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372).
127
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Therefore, according to the Third Circuit, Padilla did not announce a
new rule and the petitioner was entitled to a review of his claim under
Padilla.132
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit found Padilla did announce a
new rule because it was the first time the Supreme Court held the Sixth
Amendment required counsel to inform his client “about matters not
directly related to their client’s criminal prosecution.” 133
The Seventh Circuit petitioner’s conviction became final
conviction prior to Padilla.134 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
because the conviction became final before Padilla, she was barred
from obtaining relief under Padilla—even though her attorney failed
to inform her that the deportation would stem from a guilty plea.135
The Supreme Court, one year after Padilla was decided, granted a writ
of certiorari from the Seventh Circuit in Chaidez to determine whether
Padilla announced a new rule.136
2.

Chaidez v. United States

According to the Court in Chaidez, Padilla announced a new
rule, which precluded retroactivity.137 Contrary to the Third Circuit,
the Chaidez court noted that informing a client of the collateral
consequences stemming from a guilty plea “is never a violation of the
Sixth Amendment.”138 In making this determination, Chaidez pointed
to the fact that all ten federal appellate courts and thirty state appellate
courts agreed the Sixth Amendment did not extend to informing a
client of collateral consequences of a guilty plea. 139 This lack of
precedent, therefore, barred any retroactive application of Padilla
because its Strickland analysis of a failure to advise claim in the
context of a collateral consequence broke new ground, thus, creating a
132

Id.
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693 (“Before Padilla,the Court had never held that the Sixth
Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to provide advice about matters not directly
related to their client’s criminal prosecution.”).
134 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 345.
135 Id. at 346.
136 Id. at 347.
137 Id. at 357 (“This Court announced a new rule in Padilla. Under Teague, defendants
whose convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding.”).
138 Id. at 350.
139 Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 350 (“All 10 federal appellate courts to consider the question
decided, in the words of one, that “counsel’s failure to inform a defendant of the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea is never” a violation of the Sixth Amendment.”).
133
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new rule.140 Accordingly, a petitioner could not obtain relief under
Padilla because, although her attorney may have failed to advise her
that she would be deported, her conviction became final before
Padilla.141
Chaidez, however, acknowledged relief had previously been
granted under Strickland when counsel misadvised clients about
deportation.142 Despite this admission, both state and federal courts
have denied relief to petitioners asserting misadvice claims on the
grounds that Padilla’s rule applied to all advice claims involving
collateral consequences.143
In Chavarria v. United States,144 for example, the Seventh
Circuit held the Sixth Amendment did not cover failure to advise or
misadvise prior to Padilla.145 In Chavarria, the petitioner, a permanent
resident from Mexico, repeatedly asked his attorney whether
deportation would follow from a conviction.146 Each time the attorney
140

Id. at 354.
Id. at 347.
142 Id. at 356.
True enough, three federal circuits (and a handful of state courts) held
before Padilla that misstatements about deportation could support an
ineffective assistance claim. But those decisions reasoned only that a
lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise
actively mislead his client on any important matter, however related to a
criminal prosecution.
Id. (emphasis added).
143 Chavarria v. United States, 739 F.3d 360, 362-63 (7th Cir. 2014).
A lawyer’s advice about matters not involving the “direct”
consequences of a criminal conviction—collateral matters—is, in fact,
irrelevant under the Sixth Amendment; such advice is categorically
excluded from analysis as professionally incompetent, as measured by
Strickland. . . . Thus, regardless of how egregious the failure of counsel
was if it dealt with immigration consequences, pre-Padilla, both the Sixth
Amendment and the Strickland test were irrelevant.
The Chaidez majority jointly referred to both misadvice and nonadvice throughout its opinion. There is no question that the majority
understood that Padilla announced a new rule for all advice, or lack
thereof, with respect to the consequences of a criminal conviction for
immigration status.
Id.; see also United States v. Florian, No. 86 CR 850, 2016 WL 4611422, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (relying on Chaidez and Chavarria, the court explained that the petitioner could not
obtain relief on a misadvice claim because petitioner’s conviction became final prior to
Padilla); Barajas v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 3d 952, 959 (N.D. Iowa 2016) (same); State
v. Merheb, 858 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Neb. 2015) (same).
144 739 F.3d 360 (7th Cir. 2014).
145 Id. at 364.
146 Id. at 361.
141

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 [2018], Art. 7

842

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

responded, “[T]he Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement .
. . were not interested in deporting him.”147 The attorney also told
petitioner to ignore the warnings from the judge regarding
deportation.148 Nonetheless, the court in Chavarria held that
petitioners, whose convictions became final prior to Padilla, were
precluded from any retroactive relief for a misadvice claim.149
3.

Pre-Padilla

In 1970, the D.C. Circuit Court raised the possibility of a
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on erroneous
advice concerning the likelihood of deportation.150 Fifteen years later,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s
post-conviction motion and remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing regarding whether the petitioner’s counsel misadvised him
regarding the prospect of deportation.151 According to the Eleventh
Circuit, petitioner changed his plea from not guilty to guilty following
the government’s decision to drop a count, and his attorney told him
he was not deportable.152 Once he was released, he discovered he was
subject to deportation and challenged his conviction.153
The Eleventh Circuit made clear it would not “hold that an
affirmative misrepresentation by an attorney in response to a specific
inquiry by the accused which results in a plea of guilty necessarily
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.”154 However, the court
then explained a Strickland analysis requires courts to consider all the
circumstances.155 Accordingly, the case was remanded to establish
whether petitioner’s allegations that his attorney misrepresented the
prospect of deportation, which influenced his ability to enter a well-

147

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 361.
149 Chavarria, 739 F.3d at 361.
150 United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Under appropriate
circumstances the fact that a defendant has been misled as to [the] consequences of
deportability may render his guilty plea subject to attack.”).
151 Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1985).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1540.
155 Id. at 1541.
148
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informed guilty plea.156 Consistent with Lee, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized—as early as 1985—attorney misadvice on a determinative
issue warrants a second look and thus remanded to determine whether
deportation was the determinative issue for the defendant in entering
his guilty plea.157
Subsequent cases, such as United States v. Couto,158 held that
“affirmative misrepresentation[s] by counsel as to the deportation
consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively unreasonable.”159
The Second Circuit relied on prior case law, which held counsel “has
the obligation of advising [a non-citizen client] of his particular
position as a consequence of his plea.”160 In Couto, the petitioner, a
Brazilian citizen, was convicted of bribery and conspiracy to commit
bribery of an Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
official.161 Petitioner’s attorney told her if she did not accept the
government’s plea agreement, she likely would face incarceration, but
would not by pleading guilty.162 Of particular relevance, despite
receiving notice of possible deportation from INS, petitioner’s attorney
then erroneously informed her that deportation was avoidable through
various means including a recommendation letter from the judge.163
At the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court on
post-conviction review, petitioner explained she would not have
pleaded guilty had she known she would be subject to automatic
deportation.164 This misrepresentation, combined with evidence of a

156 Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1541 (“As a result, we conclude that under these unique
circumstances Downs-Morgan is at least entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if he
was afforded reasonably effective assistance from his counsel in deciding to plead guilty.”).
157 See infra Part IV.B.2.
158 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356.
159 Id. at 188.
160 Id. at 187 (quoting Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974)); see United
States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Counsel has not merely failed to inform,
but has effectively misled, his client about the immigration consequences of a conviction,
counsel’s performance is objectively unreasonable under contemporary standards for attorney
competence.”), opinion amended on reh’g, No. 03-50315, 2005 WL 1692492 (9th Cir.
2005), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 n.50 (“Even if
the defendant were not initially aware of [possible waiver of deportation under the
Immigration and Nationality Act’s prior] § 212(c), competent defense counsel, following the
advice of numerous practice guides, would have advised him concerning the provision’s
importance.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
161 Couto, 311 F.3d at 182.
162 Id. at 183.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 184.
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“reasonable probability,”165 that, but for counsel’s error, she would not
have pled guilty and gone to trial, satisfied both prongs of Strickland,
which invalidated the earlier guilty plea.166
Courts prior to Padilla have clearly recognized that non-citizen
defendants could successfully raise an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim when their attorneys affirmatively misrepresent the likelihood of
deportation following a guilty plea, and the petitioner relied on this
advice because deportation was a determinative issue.167 Thus,
Padilla’s new rule is confined to failure to advise claims, and not
misadvice claims, because courts prior to Padilla have recognized
misadvice claims in the Sixth Amendment context.168 Proof lies in the
fact that three circuit courts held, after Padilla and Chaidez, that
Padilla’s holding is retroactive with regard to misadvice claims.169 In
doing so, these courts decided, in reliance on their own precedent and
the retroactivity application elicited by Teague, that claims based on
erroneous advice concerning deportation at the plea stage are grounds
for reversal under Strickland.170
4.

Post-Padilla & Chaidez

The Second Circuit, in Kovacs v. United States,171 explained
prior courts acknowledged that misadvice claims fell within the gambit
of ineffective counsel contexts dating back to the 1970s.172 Although

165

Id. at 188.
Couto, 311 F.3d at 191.
167 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 53 (holding a defendant can satisfy Strickland by showing that
immigration consequences were the determinative issue in entering a guilty plea and his
attorney erroneously told him pleading guilty to the charged offense would not impact his
immigration status); see Chan, 792 F.3d at 1154 (same); United States v. Castro-Taveras, 841
F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (same).
168 Chan, 792 F.3d at 1152 (“Because we conclude that Kwan both survives Padilla v.
Kentucky, and did not establish a new rule of criminal procedure under Teague v. Lane, we
thus hold that Kwan applies retroactively to Chan’s case.” (citations omitted)).
169 See supra infra Part IV.A.4.
170 See infra Part IV.A.4.
171 744 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2014).
172 Id. at 50.
We have little trouble concluding that, by the time Kovacs’
conviction became final, the Couto rule was indicated, and was awaiting
an instance in which it would be pronounced. Courts had concluded
similar misadvice was objectively unreasonable as far back as the 1970s;
our decisions reflected this trend long before Kovacs conviction.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
166
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the defendant’s conviction in Kovacs became final prior to the Second
Circuit’s decision in Couto, he was still entitled to relief because
“Couto did nothing more than apply the ‘age-old principle that a
lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a client.’”173 Therefore, the
Second Circuit held that the petitioner satisfied his burden of showing
prejudice because he could have litigated a statute of limitations
defense or negotiated a plea favorable to his immigration status at
trial.174 The petitioner, like Lee, was able to prove deportation was the
determinative issue by pointing to the record of the plea hearing, which
allowed the court to reverse the conviction in reliance on its own
precedent.175
In United States v. Castro-Taveras,176 the First Circuit
elaborated on the holding in Kovacs regarding the “age-old principle
that a lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a client” by undergoing a
lengthy analysis of retroactivity.177 The petitioner’s post-conviction
petition alleged the 2003 conviction was invalid because it was
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment due to his attorney’s
misrepresentation of deportation consequences, which motivated his
guilty plea.178 Prior to the retroactivity analysis, however, the court
remarked that neither Padilla nor Chaidez expressly addressed
whether misadvice claims are subject to a Strickland analysis.179
Further, the court explained that it needed to dissect the question

173

Id. at 51 (quoting Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 367) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 53.
175 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 48.
Kovacs’ immigration concerns were aired during the plea hearing. At the
outset, [counsel] sought to seal the minutes of the guilty plea so
immigration officials could not see them. The district court warned
Kovacs that immigration consequences were not in its control and that it
would give no such assurance. [Counsel], however, responded that he
“researched it and we feel comfortable that this is not a deportable
offense.” At the conclusion of the proceeding, [counsel] again stated that
“misprision of felony is not deportable.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
176 841 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016). In Castro-Taveras, petitioner, a lawful permanent resident,
plead guilty to what he discovered was an aggravated felony carrying mandatory deportation
following his attorney’s conclusion that a probationary sentence would not result in
deportation. Id. at 36. Six years after his three-year probationary sentence ended, petitioner
applied for naturalization, but was denied because his probationary sentence did in fact carry
with it mandatory deportation. Id. at 37-38.
177 See id. at 40-52.
178 Id. at 38.
179 Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d at 43.
174
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regarding retroactivity in Teague, the seminal retroactivity case.180
The court explained, if the circuit addressing the claim anticipated that
the Supreme Court created a “new rule,” a petitioner could get relief
even though the conviction was obtained prior to announcing this new
rule.181 Conversely, if the circuit court did not have the new rule of
law announced by the Court, but the state of the law reflected an
understanding that the Supreme Court affirmed a new rule, the
petitioner could nevertheless obtain relief.182

180

Id. at 46.
Having concluded that Padilla and Chaidez left undecided the
question of whether Padilla’s new rule excludes (or includes)
misrepresentation claims, we must undertake our own analysis as to
whether Padilla’s holding on misadvice would have constituted a new rule
based on the state of the law in the lower courts as of 2003. Indeed, the
relevant question, in the language of Teague, is whether the lower courts
in 2003 would have considered application of Strickland to a misadvice
claim regarding deportation consequences “a garden-variety application
of the test in Strickland,” Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107, such that it was
“apparent to all reasonable jurists,” Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528, 117 S. Ct.
1517, that Strickland applied to Castro’s claim.

Id.
181

Id. at 41.

Even when a Supreme Court holding constitutes a new rule, however,
a defendant may still be able to take advantage of the legal principle it
articulates in a collateral proceeding. That would be so if the applicable
circuit law, at the time the defendant’s conviction became final, was
consistent with the Supreme Court’s subsequently pronounced rule—i.e.,
if circuit precedent anticipated the path the Supreme Court would take,
even though that law “would [not] have been ‘apparent to all reasonable
jurists.’”
Id. (quoting Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 47 (quoting Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 527–28)); see Kovacs,
744 F.3d at 50–51 (identifying the circuit precedents that preceded Padilla); see also id. at 46
(“If Padilla’s holding on misadvice constituted a new rule in 2003 based on the state of the
law in the lower courts, then Castro’s Sixth Amendment claim would be barred under Teague,
unless he can show that the First Circuit was an exception—i.e., we had a case prior to 2003
that would have dictated the same outcome as Padilla would in this case.” (citation omitted)).
182 See Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d at 48.
That is to say, while no case of our own can support the proposition that
“all reasonable jurists,” Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528, 117 S. Ct. 1517, would
have agreed that an affirmative misrepresentation on deportation
consequences is subject to Strickland, pre–2003 law in other lower
courts—combined with our own—could lead us to conclude that Padilla’s
misadvice holding was, to borrow the words of our sister circuit, simply
“awaiting an instance in which it would be pronounced,” Kovacs, 744 F.3d
at 50.
Id.
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The First Circuit previously permitted ineffective counsel
claims based on collateral consequence claims derived from erroneous
attorney advice.183 However, that alone was not enough according to
the court.184 In other words, similar holdings in the circuit, which do
not directly address the new rule, are not sufficient for a defendant to
obtain retroactive relief.185 In these situations, where the circuit does
not explicitly address the new rule, the state of the law must either
permit misadvice claims for immigration consequences nationwide or
the various holdings “appl[y] a general standard to the kind of factual
circumstance it was meant to address.”186
The court pointed to a number of district court and state court
187
cases prior to Padilla, which held both misadvice claims relating to
deportation consequences, and collateral consequences in general, are
triable ineffective assistance of counsel issues pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment.188 Therefore, the Castro-Taveras court concluded,
183 Id. at 47-48 (citing Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973); Cepulonis v.
Ponte, 699 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1983); Wellman v. Maine, 962 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1992)).
184 Id. at 48. “[T]he fact that a court says that its decision is within the ‘logical compass’ of
an earlier decision, or indeed that it is ‘controlled’ by a prior decision, is not conclusive for
purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.” Id. (quoting
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)).
185 Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d at 48.
186 Id. at 50 (quoting Chaidez, 568 U.S at 347); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Where the beginning point is a rule of general application,
a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be
the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by
precedent.”).
187 See infra note 188.
188 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 49-51; see Couto, 311 F.3d at 188; Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at
1540-41; United States v. Khalaf, 116 F.Supp. 2d 210, 214 (D. Mass. 1999) (explaining that
an attorney’s affirmative misrepresentation in response to a specific question about deportation
consequences “may, under certain circumstances, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”
(citations omitted)); United States v. Mora-Gomez, 875 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(same); Beavers v. Saffle, 216 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ttorney advice which
misrepresents the date of parole eligibility by several years can be objectively unreasonable.”);
Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “a defendant may be
entitled to habeas relief if counsel provides parole eligibility information that proves to be
grossly erroneous”); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[G]ross
misadvice concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.”);
Hill, 894 F.2d at 1010 (en banc) (“[T]he erroneous parole-eligibility advice given to Mr. Hill
was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.”); Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 n.6
(5th Cir. 1987) (“Even if the Sixth Amendment does not impose on counsel an affirmative
obligation to inform clients of the parole consequences of their pleas, . . . other courts have
recognized a distinction between failure to inform and giving misinformation.”); Strader v.
Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[T]hough parole eligibility dates are collateral
consequences of the entry of a guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed if he
does not inquire, when he is grossly misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that
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although the petitioner was convicted in 2003, he can still bring the
claim because he was not barred by lack of retroactivity.189
Clearly, Chavarria and other courts erred in holding that
Chaidez barred misadvice claims where the convictions were final
prior to Padilla.190 With that in mind, the following section will turn
to the second split in order to determine why Padilla’s retroactivity is
relevant. While Lee confirms Padilla is retroactive regarding
misadvise claims (thus, subjecting such claims to a Strickland
analysis), the remaining question to be answered is whether, or to what
extent, Lee’s second holding—it could be rational to gamble losing at
trial to avoid deportation—is retroactive.
B.

It Is Rational To Reject a Favorable Plea In Order
To Try and Avoid Deportation at Trial

The obvious holding in Lee is that under Lee’s “unusual
circumstances,” it would not be irrational to reject the favorable plea
in lieu of going to trial to avoid deportation.191 Considering Padilla is
retroactive regarding misadvice claims, the looming question is
whether, and to what extent, Lee has any retroactive effect. It could be
readily assumed Lee restricted its holding to circumstances where the
misinformation, he is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.”). See also state cases
affirming misadvise claims concerning collateral consequences are subject to Strickland,
which include the following: Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Cist. Ct. App. 2d
2001); Goodall v. United States, 759 A.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. 2000); State v. Vieira, 760 A.2d
840, 843–44 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000); People v. Ping Cheung, 718 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup.
Ct. 2000); State v. Goforth, 503 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); People v. Garcia, 815 P.2d
937, 942 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Hinson v. State, 377 S.E.2d 338, 339 (S.C. 1989); In re
Peters, 750 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa
1983).
189 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 52-53.
190 Chan, 792 F.3d at 1157-58.
[W]e acknowledge that our conclusion puts us at odds with the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling in Chavarria . . . .
Ultimately, we read the language in Chaidez differently than the
Seventh Circuit did in Chavarria, and we agree with the Second Circuit’s
analysis in Kovacs. We thus conclude that Kwan did not announce a new
rule of criminal procedure under Teague and that the rule in Kwan—
affirmative misrepresentations by defense counsel regarding immigration
consequences is deficient under Strickland—can support Chan’s IAC
claim.
Id. (internal citations omitted)
191 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967 (“In the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that Lee
has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea had
he known that it would lead to mandatory deportation.”).
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difference in sentence between pleading guilty and trial was a few
years.192 For example, it is unlikely the Court would determine that
rejecting a plea agreement for two years to pursue a trial, where the
defendant faces fifty years, is in fact rational when deportation is
inevitable.193 Alternatively, maybe Lee adopted a strict interpretation
of Hill, which focuses on the defendant’s decision to take the plea
rather than the outcome.194
Although the two approaches seem to come into conflict, the
Court explained, when “the error is one that is not alleged to be
pertinent to a trial outcome, but is instead alleged to have affected a
defendant’s understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea,”
predicting the outcome of trial is not necessary.195 In fact, during oral
arguments, Justice Kagan seemed unpersuaded by the Government’s
argument that Lee’s inevitable deportation disabled him from showing
prejudice by pointing to the Hill inquiry.196 The Lee Court likely chose
to apply a strict application of Hill, but restricted it to situations where
the decision to reject a plea in favor of trial would be rational so to
192

Id. at 1966-67.
The decision whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the respective
consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea. When those
consequences are, from the defendant’s perspective, similarly dire, even
the smallest chance of success at trial may look attractive. For example, a
defendant with no realistic defense to a charge carrying a 20–year sentence
may nevertheless choose trial, if the prosecution’s plea offer is 18 years.

Id.
193

Id. at 1966.
A defendant without any viable defense will be highly likely to lose at
trial. And a defendant facing such long odds will rarely be able to show
prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution
than would be likely after trial. But that is not because the prejudice
inquiry in this context looks to the probability of a conviction for its own
sake. It is instead because defendants obviously weigh their prospects at
trial in deciding whether to accept a plea.

Id.
194

Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966.
The Government asks that we, like the Court of Appeals below, adopt
a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice
from the denial of his right to trial. . . . And, more fundamentally, the
Government overlooks that the inquiry we prescribed in Hill v. Lockhart
focuses on a defendant’s decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on
the likelihood of conviction after trial.
Id. (emphasis added).
195 Id. at 1967 n.3.
196 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (No.
16-327).
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avoid the types of claims the dissent anticipated.197 Therefore, to
ascertain whether, and to what extent, non-citizen petitioners can
obtain retroactive relief under Lee, courts must evaluate the rationality
of decisions regarding a defendant’s rejection of a plea in lieu of trial.
Wrestling with whether it is rational to throw a “Hail Mary” at
trial in lieu of a favorable plea after Padilla, the circuit courts fall into
two categories. Courts in the first category hold that no defendant can
show prejudice when deportation is inevitable and the chances of
obtaining any form of relief at trial is impossible; courts in the second
category hold the opposite.198
1.

It Could Be Rational If Relief Can Be
Obtained At Trial

The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Akinsade,199 held the
petitioner’s decision to reject the plea would be rational because he
could have contested the restitution amount.200 In Akinsade, the
petitioner was a lawful permanent resident from Nigeria who lived in
the United States since he was seven years old.201 Twelve years after
his arrival in the United States, he was charged with embezzlement.202
During plea negotiations, petitioner twice asked his attorney if a
conviction would result in deportation.203 Both times, the attorney
replied in the negative because “he could only be deported if he had
two felony convictions.”204 Relying on his attorney’s advice, the
petitioner pleaded guilty—receiving a one-month sentence—only to
find out the charged offense warranted mandatory deportation.205

197 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting.) (“Under its rule, so long as a
defendant alleges that his counsel omitted or misadvised him on a piece of information during
the plea process that he considered of “paramount importance,” ante, at 1968, he could allege
a plausible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
198 See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
199 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012).
200 Id. at 256. Ultimately, while the record supported the petitioner’s ineffective counsel
claim, he succeeded on his prejudice claim because he showed that he could have contested
the restitution at trial, but for the attorney’s erroneous advice. Id.
201 Id. at 250.
202 Id.
203 Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 250.
204 Id.
205 Id.
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During the plea hearing, the judge informed the petitioner he “could”
be deported if he was not a citizen.206
On these facts, the reviewing district court denied the
petitioner’s claim. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument because
the district court’s admonishment was not concise enough because the
petitioner was not told deportation was mandatory.207 Therefore,
considering the court agreed that the petitioner could have contested
the restitution amount at trial, the attorney’s erroneous advice
prejudiced him because going to trial would have been rational.208
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit, in Kovacs,
explained prejudice is cognizable if the petitioner could show that he
could have obtained an alternative disposition preventing deportation
after trial.209 In Kovacs, because the petitioner could have obtained a
plea avoiding deportation—which the government likely would have
accepted—he demonstrated prejudice.210 Specifically, the court
explained that the petitioner had a statute of limitations defense that
could have culminated in alternative plea.211 Similarly, in United
206 Id. at 254 (“Instead, the district court warned that Akinsade’s plea could lead to
deportation.” (emphasis in original)).
207 Id. at 254, 265 n.6. In other cases in which the district court’s admonishment was found
to have corrected counsel’s ineffective assistance regarding deportation, the courts inquired
into whether the defendant understood the specific warning pertaining to deportation. See,
e.g., United States v. Hernandez–Monreal, 404 F. App’x 714, 715; Gonzalez v. United States,
Nos. 10 Civ. 5463(AKH), 08 Cr. 146(AKH), 2010 WL 3465603, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
2010) (explaining that the district court twice advised the defendant that he faced potential
deportation and specifically asked the defendant, given that risk, whether he still wanted to
plead guilty); United States v. Cruz–Veloz, Crim. No. 07–1023, 2010 WL 2925048, at *3
(D.N.J. Jul. 20, 2010) (finding the petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to advise
of deportation consequences because the district court admonished him that he would subject
himself to deportation and further asked whether he understood the deportation consequence
and still wanted to plead guilty). Here, the district court did not elicit a direct response to the
deportation admonishment, but instead asked if Akinsade understood a list of generalized
warnings of which deportation was a part. Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 254.
208 Id. at 256.
209 Kovacs, 744 F.3d at 52.
We conclude that a defense lawyer’s incorrect advice about the
immigration consequences of a plea is prejudicial if it is shown that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there was a reasonable probability that
the petitioner could have negotiated a plea that did not impact immigration
status or that he would have litigated an available defense.
Id.
210 Id.; see, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 730 F. App’x 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2018) (Petitioner,
convicted before Padilla, was granted coram nobis relief for her ineffective assistance of
counsel claim because counsel’s performance precluded from raising a possible defense and
the record unambiguously supported this contention.)
211 Id. at 52-53.
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States v. Chan,212 the district court held that the petitioner could not
obtain relief because she could not show an alternative disposition at
trial was possible.213 Prior to Lee, a bare showing of prejudice (i.e.,
without a contestable issue or chance of conviction for a nondeportable offense) deriving from the misadvice would not have been
enough in the Fourth or Second Circuits.
2.

It Could Be Rational Regardless Of Relief

On the other end of the spectrum, in Hernandez v. United
States, the Eleventh Circuit held the defendant, a Cuban citizen
legally living in the United States, was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the attorney’s erroneous advice
regarding deportation, supported by the record, prejudiced him.215
Although the Eleventh Circuit noted it need not hold an evidentiary
hearing “if the allegations are ‘patently frivolous’ . . . or ‘affirmatively
contradicted by the record,’”216 the court still held that an evidentiary
hearing was required to determine if the petitioner was prejudiced
214

To prevail on that ground, a petitioner must therefore demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the prosecution would have accepted, and the
court would have approved, a deal that had no adverse effect on the
petitioner’s immigration status. . . .
...
Kovacs has sustained the very considerable burden of establishing
prejudice under the principles reviewed above. It is apparent from the
transcript of the Rule 11 hearing that Kovacs’ single-minded focus in the
plea negotiations was the risk of immigration consequences.
Id.
212

No. CR 93-00583-RGK, 2015 WL 11438556, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015).
Id. at *2.
214 778 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2015).
215 Id. at 1233-34.
Hernandez alleged that his counsel advised him that there was a
“substantial likel[i]hood that he would not be deported.” But “deportation
[i]s presumptively mandatory” for convictions related to trafficking in a
controlled substance.” see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at
any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law
. . . relating to a controlled substance . . . is deportable.”). The record
corroborates Hernandez’s allegation because his counsel stated on the
record that she “informed him that based on . . . [her] past experience . . .
Cuban Defendants . . . generally . . . are not deported back to Cuba.”
Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
216 Id. at 1232 (quoting Winthrop–Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.
2014) (quoting Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989)).
213
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because the facts supported an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.217
Contrary to Kovacs and Akinsade, the Eleventh Circuit opinion
lacks any indicia that the petitioner in Hernandez was unable to offer
a strategical reason for pursuing trial, but instead relied exclusively on
his ties to the United States and the attorney’s misadvice regarding
deportation.218 The Eleventh Circuit held the petitioner’s choice to risk
more time in prison—he received 120 months—to remain in the
United States could be rational.219 Synthesizing a rule for the pre-Lee
cases is complicated because, while the circuit courts agreed erroneous
advice regarding deportation satisfied the first Strickland prong, they
disagreed on what needed to be shown to satisfy prejudice.220
Specifically, they disagreed as to whether an alternative disposition
could be reached at trial.221
Lee clarifies this ambiguity because, unlike the defendant in
Kovacs and Akinsade, Lee, like the petitioner in Hernandez had no real
strategical reason to pursue trial except to avoid deportation.222 Lee
had strong ties to the United States, ample evidence of his allegation
in the record, and a few years to lose by pursuing trial.223 Thus,
although Lee did not expressly address retroactivity, it seems the Court
was cognizant of the split concerning what is rational and narrowed its
rule to limit its application to cases where vacating the sentence would
not appear to give the petitioner deference to, in the words of
Strickland, the “luck of a lawless decisionmaker.”224 In the Second,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, therefore, the existing state of law would
permit retroactive Lee-relief so long as the petitioner could obtain an
alternative disposition while in the Eleventh Circuit, Lee will impose a
higher bar.

217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1232.
Akinsade, 686 F.3d at 250.
Id.
Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1969.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
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APPLYING LEE

The number of cases citing Lee increases almost every day. As
of February 2018, a majority of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
cases citing Lee do not involve the immigration question.225 Rather,
only two of the ten federal Circuit Court of Appeals cases involved a
non-citizen petitioner seeking relief for attorney failures to properly
advise them as to immigration consequences of entering a guilty
plea.226 This section will consider how the federal courts interpret
Lee.227
A.

Federal District Courts Applying Lee in
Immigration Contexts

The district courts, for the most part, have strictly applied Lee,
but some petitioners have successfully overturned their convictions
through Lee.228 The means by which the court granted relief, however,
225

Cases not involving immigration are not discussed in this Note, but suffice to say
petitioners have relied on Lee’s principle that erroneous advice by counsel prior to entering a
plea is a ground for voiding the plea because pursuing a trial would be rational. Compare
Pola, 703 F. App’x at 414 (deportation), Dodd v. United States, 709 F. App’x 593 (11th Cir.
2017) (same), with Young v. Spinner, 873 F.3d 282, 283 (5th Cir. 2017) (mistaken belief
regarding prospective sentence); Fox v. United States, No. 17-5352, 2017 WL 4404676, at *1
(6th Cir. July 27, 2017) (same); Thompson v. United States, 872 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 2017)
(same); Spriggs v. United States, No. 15-10659, 2017 WL 3411796, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 9,
2017) (attorney failed to pursue motion to suppress); Vaughn, 2017 WL 3484974, at *1
(attorney failed to communicate plea offer and object to guideline enhancement); United States
v. Buchanan, 698 F. App’x 149, 150 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the district court erred in
failing to allow withdrawal of plea); Schneider v. United States, 864 F.3d 518, 519 (7th Cir.
2017) (“[T]rial lawyer was ineffective for advising him that he met the statutory elements of
the offense of sexual abuse of a minor and for not explaining that his prior conduct could be
considered during sentencing.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 437 (2017); and Stillwell v. United
States, 709 F. App’x 585 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[C]ounsel rendered ineffective assistance by
advising [petitioner] that the conduct related to two dismissed counts would not be considered
relevant conduct for sentencing and that his appeal waiver would not prevent him from
appealing the district court’s guidelines calculations.”).
226 See infra Part V.B.
227 State court decisions are omitted because a state denial of post-conviction relief can be
appealed to federal district court, which will analyze the claim under established federal law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (2016) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States . . . .”).
228 See, e.g., United States v. Tzen, No. 16-0734-DRH, 2017 WL 4233077, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
Sept. 22, 2017); United States v. Hernandez, 282 F. Supp. 3d 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); United
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have varied.229 For instance, in Hernandez, the petitioner only
proffered a self-serving affidavit in support of her ineffective
assistance claim.230 Even though the affidavit was the sole evidence,
the district court inferred its validity from an immigration court’s
finding that her attorney’s performance was ineffective.231
Conversely, in United States v. Garcia,232 the district court held
that the petitioner’s declaration alone was insufficient to support a
claim that his attorney misadvised him regarding whether a guilty plea
would result in automatic deportation.233 The court stated, because
Garcia’s conviction became final prior to Padilla, “[H]e must show
that counsel affirmatively misrepresented immigration consequences
to him.”234
1.

Tzen v. United States

In Tzen v. United States,235 the petitioner, a British citizen
living in the United States, had her conviction overturned because her
attorney failed to advise her of the deportation consequences of
pleading guilty.236 Although petitioner also raised a claim that her
attorney misadvised her, the Southern District of Illinois emphasized
that its holding was based on the failure to advise claim.237 Despite
this admonition, however, the court focused on petitioner’s ability to
show, through her actions and the record, that deportation was the
determinative issue in her decision to plead guilty.238
States v. Arce-Flores, No. CR15-0386JLR, 2017 WL 4586326, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 16,
2017).
229 See infra Part V.A.1-2.
230 Hernandez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 150.
231 Id. at 151, 154.
232 No. CR 99-0699-RSWL-3, 2017 WL 3669542, *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017).
233 Id. at *4 (“Permitting such a declaration to carry the day for an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel analysis would allow virtually any defendant to retroactively claim that his attorney
told him he would not be deported.”).
234 Id. at *3 (citing Chan, 792 F.3d at 1154).
235 No. 16-0734-DRH, 2017 WL 4233077, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2017).
236 Id. at *4.
237 Id. at *1 (“[T]he Court focuses its discussion entirely to Tzen’s argument that counsel
was ineffective in that he failed to inform her that if she pled guilty to the charges in the
Indictment that she would be automatically deported.”).
238 Id. at *4 (“It is clear to the Court that had Tzen received both clear and correct advice
regarding her immigration status and clear and correct advice regarding the application of the
aforementioned pattern instruction insofar as her the suspicion or indifference of her wrongdoing, she would not have pleaded guilty.”)
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The petitioner hired an immigration attorney who told her she
could avoid deportation by showing she was not a national security
threat.239 Moreover, her trial lawyer e-mailed the Assistant United
States Attorney (“AUSA”) saying, “Tzen is desperate not to be
deported.”240 The court also emphasized her plea agreement only
states she “may” be deported and during the plea hearing she was told
there “was a real possibility of being deported.”241 Lastly, her attorney
failed to challenge a jury instruction, which foreclosed a valid
defense.242 The combination of the “confusing, conflicting, and
wrong” advice given by her attorneys and the courts’ failure to clarify
the confusion was enough for petitioner to successfully argue that her
Sixth Amendment rights were violated.243
2.

United States v. Arce-Flores

In United States v. Arce-Flores,244 the petitioner challenged her
2016 time-served conviction arguing her attorney misadvised her as to
the implications of a guilty plea on her chances of avoiding removal.245
She rejected an otherwise favorable plea to ensure that she had a
chance at contesting her removal for being in the country illegally.246
According to the record, her attorney explained, “as long as Ms. ArceFlores pleaded guilty to a crime for which the maximum sentence was
less than 365 days, she would be eligible to contest her removal.”247
On that presumption, the petitioner instructed her attorney to make a
counter-offer where she would plead guilty to a lesser offense, which
carried a maximum sentence of six months.248 The Government agreed
and petitioner received a sentence of time served.249 She was then

239 Id. at *3 (“[Immigration attorney] stated: If not, the next best thing would be to have the
Judge and the prosecutor put on the record, and judgment and sentence, that they do not feel
Gemma is a threat to national security, border security, or public safety and they do not
recommend that she be deported back to England.” (internal quotations omitted)).
240 Tzen, 2017 WL 4233077, at *3.
241 Id.
242 Id. at *4.
243 Id. at *3.
244
No. CR15-0386JLR, 2017 WL 4586326, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 16, 2017).
245 Id. at *3.
246 Id. at *2.
247 Id. at *1.
248 Id.
249 Arce-Flores, 2017 WL 4586326, at *2.
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remanded to ICE custody for removal proceedings because “she had
served at least 180 days for a criminal offense.” 250
In light of her attorney’s error, the petitioner asked the district
court to re-sentence her to 179 days to potentially avoid removal by
showing she was of good moral character.251 The petitioner also
pursued a writ of coram nobis (withdrawal of a guilty plea).252 The
district court denied the petitioner’s request stating “the most lenient
sentence it could impose . . . was six (6) months.” 253 However, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the issue to the district court to
consider the coram nobis writ. 254
Prior to the remand, the district court explained, relying on Lee,
that in the immigration context, Strickland’s first prong is satisfied
when counsel fails to advise, or misadvises, the petitioner of
immigration consequences stemming from a guilty plea.255 According
to the court, the petitioner satisfied her burden.256 Regarding
Strickland’s prejudice prong, however, the petitioner must show
rejecting the plea would be rational under the circumstances.257
Specifically, for non-citizens illegally in the United States, the court
explained the petitioner can satisfy its burden by (1) citing cases
indicating the government allowed a similarly charged defendant to
plead to a non-removable offense, (2) showing the plea was motivated

250

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
252 Id. at *4.
253 Id. at *3.
254 United States v. Arce-Flores, No. CR15-0386JLR, 2018 WL 401524, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 12, 2018) (“The court ordered the supplemental briefing after the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals remanded Ms. Arce-Flores’s appeal ‘for the limited purpose of enabling the [ ] court
to consider [her] motion for a writ of error coram nobis.’” (alteration in original) (internal
citations omitted)).
255 Id. at *8.
256 Arce-Flores, 2017 WL 4586326, at *9.
During plea negotiations, Mr. Engelhard affirmatively advised Ms. ArceFlores that as long as she pleaded guilty to an offense with a maximum
sentence below 365 days, she would still be able to contest her removal
from the United States. . . . Thus, Mr. Engelhard misadvised Ms. ArceFlores about the immigration consequences, despite clear law on this
issue. This misadvice also undermined the plea agreement and plea
colloquy’s general warnings about the possibility of deportation, given
that Ms. Arce-Flores believed the crime to which she was pleading guilty
would nevertheless allow her to contest removal.
Id.
257 Id. at *10.
251
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by a desire to avoid deportation, and (3) “in the absence of a more
favorable plea agreement, he or she would have gone to trial.”258
Following the remand, the court explained, unlike other cases
involving a non-citizen petitioner illegally in the United States, the
instant petitioner was trying to cancel her removal by satisfying the
“good moral character” requirement prescribed in 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1).259 In light of the remand, the court affirmed its initial
finding that the petitioner satisfied Strickland.260 Although the court
did not reiterate the factors it concluded were necessary for a noncitizen illegally in the United States to satisfy Strickland, the
application reflected the prescribed analysis, and the petitioner’s
sentence was not only vacated but also reduced from 180 to 179
days.261
With the exception of Garcia, district courts seem to construe
an attorney’s inconclusive opinion regarding deportation and
affirmative misrepresentation as one and the same.262 Relying on
Padilla, these courts explained, “But when the deportation
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct
advice is equally clear.”263 In other words, failing to give accurate
advice has been interpreted as a complete failure to give any advice.264
Once the first prong is met, the district courts turn to Lee to
determine whether the petitioner was prejudiced by the erroneous or

258 Id. (“A petitioner can demonstrate this prejudice by (1) identifying cases that indicate
the government’s willingness to permit defendants charged with the same or substantially
similar crime to plead guilty to a nonremovable offense, (2) showing that he or she
purposefully agreed to the charge to avoid adverse immigration consequences, or (3) in the
absence of a more favorable plea agreement, he or she would have gone to trial.” (citing Vega,
797 F.3d at 789)).
259 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2016) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal of,
and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien . . . has been a person of good
moral character during such period.”).
260 Arce-Flores, 2018 WL 401524, at *3 (“Counsel’s failure to mention the importance of
a one-day sentence reduction depriv[ed Ms. Arce-Flores] of an opportunity to have a
sentencing court exercise its discretion in her favor, which would have allowed Ms. ArceFlores to apply for the good moral character waiver. In short, counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced Ms. Arce-Flores.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)).
261
Id. at *3, *5 (“Where ‘a nominally shorter sentence’ would enable a petitioner to avoid
deportation, there is a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed the shorter
sentence.” (quoting Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1017)).
262 Tzen, 2017 WL 4233077 at *4.
263 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.
264 See United States v. Hernandez, 283 F. Supp. 3d 144, 147, 150 (S.D.NY. 2018).
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inconclusive advice.265 Although the means by which petitioners raise
this claim vary between writs of coram nobis and § 2255 motions, the
district courts have been consistent in granting relief under Strickland
so long as the claim is supported by a sufficient finding that the
determinative issue in pleading guilty is avoiding deportation.266 As
such, no acute test has been prescribed by the district courts.267
B.

Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Applying Lee in
Immigration Contexts

Unlike the district courts, petitioners have not obtained relief
in the federal circuit courts of appeals.268 However, the circuit courts
have seemingly prescribed a test to determine whether a petitioner can
obtain relief under Lee.269 While they have established concise rules;
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have carved out exceptions to prevent
relief.270
1.

United States v. Pola

In United States v. Pola,271 the petitioner, a Canadian citizen
legally living in the United States with his American wife and two
American children, had a lengthy post-conviction history.272 The
petitioner was convicted in 2010, one month before Padilla, for
“knowingly and intentionally possessing oxycodone with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).”273 One
year after the conviction, petitioner filed a § 2255 motion alleging
ineffective counsel on grounds unrelated to the immigration
consequences resulting from an error made by his attorney. 274 Six
265

See supra note 231.
Garcia, 2017 WL 3669542 at *4 (“[A]llegedly, Defendant inquired whether he would
be deported and [his attorney] told Defendant he would not be deported. By contrast, [his
attorney] states in his declaration that generally, he would note all significant discussions with
his client, but there is no apparent notation of this conversation.” (internal citations omitted)).
267 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
268 See Tzen, 2017 WL 4233077 at *1; Hernandez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 144; Arce-Flores,
2017 WL 4586326, at *1.
269
See infra Part VI.
270 See infra Part VI.
271 Pola, 703 F. App’x at 414.
272 Id. at 415.
273 Id. at 416.
274 Id.
266
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years later, however, petitioner moved to have his conviction reversed
arguing that his attorney both failed to advise and misadvised him of
deportation consequences.275
In interpreting Lee, the Sixth Circuit concluded relief was
granted to him, Lee, because (1) counsel erroneously misadvised Lee
regarding deportation, (2) deportation was the determinative issue in
pleading guilty, and (3) the record supported the allegation with
testimony by both Lee and his attorney.276 Even if the petitioner in
Pola, could show that his attorney misadvised him, the Sixth Circuit
maintained he could not show prejudice because the AUSA
“indirectly” confirmed petitioner’s deportability during the plea,
petitioner did not object, and petitioner’s passport had been
surrendered to ICE prior to entering the guilty plea.277 ICE agents,
moreover, were in the court at sentencing.278 Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit explained, petitioner had enough notice from the AUSA and
presence of ICE agents to overcome any prejudice from his attorney’s
erroneous advice.279
Petitioner’s counsel raised no concerns of deportation during
either the plea or sentencing hearings.280 The Sixth Circuit ultimately
held that the petitioner could not carry his burden because “the record
[was] devoid of evidence supporting [petitioner’s] claim that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel based on inadequate advisement
of immigration consequences.”281 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, was

275 Id. at 418, 420. (“He has not shown how more accurate advice by [his attorney] about
the likelihood of his release from the courtroom after sentencing (which did not in fact have
any impact on his immigration status) would have altered his decision to waive his rights to
trial and enter an Alford plea.” (emphasis added)).
276 Pola, 703 F. App’x at 421 (“The Lee Court went on to grant relief for three reasons: it
was undisputed that Lee’s counsel had erroneously advised him that he would not be deported;
deportation was clearly the determinative issue in Lee’s decision to plead guilty; and both Lee
and his attorney testified that Lee would have gone to trial if he had known about the
deportation consequences.”).
277 Id. at 418-19.
278 Id. at 420-21.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 419 (“The issue was also apparent, albeit not well developed, at Pola’s sentencing
hearing. Yet, again, Pola did not object to the prospect of deportation at sentencing either.”
(emphasis added)).
281 Pola, 703 F. App’x at 421 (“In sum, the record is devoid of evidence supporting Pola’s
claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on inadequate advisement of
immigration consequences.”).
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unwilling to, as it explained, grant relief based on post hoc
assertions.282
2.

Dodd v. United States

In Dodd v. United States,283 petitioner, a British citizen legally
living in the United States, sought relief arguing her counsel failed to
inform, and misinformed her, as to possible deportation.284 The crux
of petitioner’s argument is that she would have rejected the, now
deemed, unfavorable plea and gone to trial if she knew, with certainty,
the immigration consequences of doing so.285
The Eleventh Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit, turned to Lee
noting Lee obtained relief because “deportation was the determinative
issue, Lee had strong connections to the United States and no other
country, and the consequences for proceeding to trial were not
markedly harsher than pleading.”286 According to the Eleventh
Circuit, the petitioner in Dodd could not meet the criteria in Lee.287
Specifically, the record proved the determinative issue for pleading
guilty was the following: fear of “facing her daughter at trial,”
evidence presented at her son’s trial, counsel informing her she could
be deported, lack of objections or questions posed during the plea or
sentencing hearing regarding deportation, and the petitioner
“repeatedly [lying] during the proceedings.”288 Moreover, as the
Eleventh Circuit explained, petitioner inquired about transferring and
serving her sentence in England, which “weigh[ed] against a finding
that she was willing to risk a larger sentence to secure the possibility
of remaining in the United States.”289
Based on Pola and Dodd, it seems the two circuit courts to
interpret Lee in the deportation context understand the Lee majority

282 Id. at 424 (“Again, these are precisely they kinds of unsupported ‘post hoc assertions’
and mere “expressed preferences” we are adjured to ignore in favor of “contemporaneous
evidence.” Lee, at 1967. In the end, Pola has failed to make his case based on evidence.”).
283 Dodd, 709 Fed. Appx. at 593.
284 Id. at 594.
285 Id.
286
Id. at 595.
287 Id. In other words, Lee’s claim was not some post hoc assertion, but rather was “backed
by substantial and uncontroverted evidence” that he would have rejected the plea in favor of
trial if he knew deportation was inevitable. Dodd, 709 Fed. Appx. at 595.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 596.
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intended that Lee be strictly applied.290 What is interesting, however,
is how these two courts apply factors such as continuously lying on the
record and other factors that show petitioner was aware of the issue of
deportation to justify denying the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.291 Put simply, circuit courts, like the Supreme Court, likely
will grant relief only if the circumstances are truly as unusual as Lee’s
and will ensure the record fully supports the purported
circumstances.292
VI.

THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE TEST

The Court in Lee predicated its holding, according to the
dissent, on a limited interpretation of Hill.293 Its narrow rule, however,
tightens the application because Hill’s holding permitted relief by
demonstrating a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.”294 Lee’s unusual circumstances requirement is a variation of Hill
because it likely denies relief if the petitioner wants to void an
otherwise favorable plea to pursue an almost certain, far lengthier,
conviction at trial.295 Lee’s holding, moreover, sets the bar for what is
rational under Padilla.296 Lee does so in holding that although there
290

See supra note 274.
See Pola, 703 Fed. Appx. at 418-20 (explaining that the AUSA indirectly informed a
petitioner of deportation to show that the petitioner knew about deportation because of (1) the
presence of ICE agents in a courtroom to show petitioner knew about deportation, (2) the
seizure of a petitioner’s passport to show petitioner knew about deportation, and (3) the lack
of objections during plea or sentencing hearings to show that the petitioner was not concerned
with deportation). See also Dodd, 709 Fed. Appx. at 595-96 (discussing that inquiries into
prison transfers to show deportation was not the determinative issue in pleading guilty).
292 Id.
293 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1972 (“In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies almost exclusively
on the single line from Hill that the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.” (internal quotations omitted)).
294 Id. at 1964 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
295 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966-67 (“For example, a defendant with no realistic defense to a
charge carrying a 20-year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if the prosecution’s plea
offer is 18 years. . . . But where we are instead asking what an individual defendant would
have done, the possibility of even a highly improbable result may be pertinent to the extent it
would have affected his decisionmaking.”).
296 Id. at 1968-69.
We cannot agree that it would be irrational for a defendant in Lee’s
position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial. But for his attorney’s
incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the plea agreement
291
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could be a reasonable probability the petitioner would have not pled
guilty and gone to trial, the decision to do so must also be satisfactorily
rational.297 As far as the circuit courts are concerned, in relation to
those petitioning the courts, Lee’s decision would be rational only
under Lee’s unusual circumstances.298 Therefore, contrary to the
dissent’s conclusion that Lee simplified Strickland’s prejudice inquiry,
the majority’s holding actually made it harder to obtain relief because
the petitioner must satisfy the unusual circumstances requirement.299
In Pola, the Sixth Circuit set out the Lee test, but in doing so,
it omitted the unusual circumstances requirement.300 Therefore, the
proper test for relief under Lee, regardless of whether the conviction
became final prior to Padilla, requires the petitioner show (1) counsel
erroneously misadvised petitioner regarding deportation, (2)
deportation was the determinative issue in pleading guilty, (3) the
record unambiguously supports the contention that deportation was the
determinative factor, (4) the petitioner has strong ties to the United
States compared to the home country, and (5) the petitioner’s unusual
circumstances result in the difference between pleading guilty and the
maximum sentence at trial not being grossly disproportionate or an
alternative disposition could be obtained at trial. However, Pola and
Dodd illustrate how courts can carve out exceptions, which supply an
inference that the claim is merely the post hoc assertion Lee sought to
avoid.301 Reviewing examples of courts carving out exceptions to each
element will illustrate this.
First, a number of courts before and after Lee held a curative
strike could overcome prejudice resulting from an attorney’s
misadvice so long as the strike is affirmative rather than
would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost certainly. If
deportation were the “determinative issue” for an individual in plea
discussions, as it was for Lee; if that individual had strong connections to
this country and no other, as did Lee; and if the consequences of taking a
chance at trial were not markedly harsher than pleading, as in this case,
that “almost” could make all the difference. Balanced against holding on
to some chance of avoiding deportation was a year or two more of prison
time. Not everyone in Lee’s position would make the choice to reject the
plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). See also Pola, 703 Fed. Appx. at 423.
297 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Pola, 703 F. App’x at 424.
301 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

41

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 [2018], Art. 7

864

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

hypothetical.302 In fact, Lee itself mentions this in a footnote.303
Moreover, in Pola, the court explained the presence of ICE agents in
the courtroom and seizure of petitioner’s passport put him on notice
that he was subject to deportation.304
Second and third, in Dodd, the petitioner’s prior statements that
she pleaded guilty fearing her daughter would testify against her at trial
disproved the contention that deportation was the determinative
issue.305 Fourth, again in Dodd, the petitioner alleged she had strong
ties to the United States, but the court inferred from petitioner’s raising
the issue of a possible prisoner transfer to her country of origin that her
ties there were stronger.306 Thus, a reviewing court could consider
other factors in determining whether the petitioner satisfies the unusual
circumstance test, which further complicates matters for petitioners.307

302

Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1975 n. 4.
Several courts have noted that a judge’s warnings at a plea colloquy may
undermine a claim that the defendant was prejudiced by his attorney’s
misadvice. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 805 F.3d 1143, 1147
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Kayode, 777 F.3d at 728–729; Akinsade, 686 F.3d at
253; Boyd v. Yukins, 99 F. App’x 699, 705 (6th Cir. 2004). The present
case involves a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel extending to advice
specifically undermining the judge’s warnings themselves, which the
defendant contemporaneously stated on the record he did not understand.
There has been no suggestion here that the sentencing judge’s statements
at the plea colloquy cured any prejudice from the erroneous advice of
Lee’s counsel.

Id.
303

Id.; Tzen, 2017 WL 4233077, at *3.
Pola, 703 Fed. App’x at 420-21.
305 See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 296.
The primary objective of the international prisoner transfer program is to
facilitate the rehabilitation of the prisoner so that he may be a productive
member of society in his home country upon release from incarceration.
The prisoner transfer program is premised on the universal understanding
that a prisoner has the best chance of being successfully rehabilitated and
reintegrated into a society where a support system exists to assist the
prisoner’s adjustment to life after incarceration.
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Transfer Requests Submitted by Foreign Nationals, U.S.
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-oeo/guidelines-evaluation-transfer-requestssubmitted-foreign-nationals (last updated Aug. 17, 2016) (emphasis added).
307 See supra note 298.
304
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CONCLUSION

At first glance, Lee v. United States seemed to hold that a
petitioner’s decision to reject a favorable plea to pursue his
constitutional right to trial is rational even when deportation remains
inevitable.308 This assumption, however, is false. In denying Lee
relief, the Sixth Circuit remarked, although it sympathized with Lee’s
plight, its job “is neither to prosecute nor to pardon; it is simply to say
‘what the law is.’”309 Lee clarified what the law is albeit limiting its
rule to Lee’s unusual circumstances. In conclusion, although the Court
in Lee confirmed that misadvice claims are retroactive under Padilla,
a limited class of petitioners will be able to prove all five elements
required to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.

308

Zachary Segal & Cory Morris, Jae Lee v. United States: Immigration Consequences
Trump Prejudice Prong of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Analysis Under Strickland,
SUFFOLK LAW (Sept. 2017), at 18, 23, https://www.scba.org/eva/displayFile.php?
id=3227.
309 See supra note 71.
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